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Abstract
A few years ago, it was a common complaint that the international dimension of democratization and, in 
particular, the external promotion of democracy were largely neglected by scholars of comparative politics 
and international relations. By now, academic research has begun to catch up with the growth of foreign 
and development policies explicitly aiming at the international promotion and protection of democratic 
regimes. Yet, what is still a largely unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp ‘democracy 
promotion’ as an aim and strategy of democratic foreign policies – that is, to embed the empirical research 
on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international relations. This article sets out to 
contribute to filling this gap by developing a classification of competing theoretical approaches. First, research 
on the democratic peace – the one major research program concerned with democratic foreign policy – is 
used to derive potential motives behind the promotion of democracy. Then, on this basis, existing theories 
of international relations are modified in order to locate democracy promotion within the foreign policy of 
democratic states. In conclusion, the article presents four sketches of potential theoretical approaches to the 
external promotion of democracy.
Keywords
foreign policy, international security, peace-building, war
Introduction
Until a few years ago, it was a common complaint that the international dimension of democratiza-
tion and, in particular, the external promotion of democracy were largely neglected by scholars of 
comparative politics and international relations (Carothers, 2004: 2; Schraeder, 2003: 21). By now, 
this has changed. Academic research has begun to catch up with the growth of foreign and develop-
ment policies explicitly aiming at the international promotion and protection of democratic 
regimes.1 Yet, what is still a largely unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp 
‘democracy promotion’ as an aim and strategy of democratic foreign policies – that is, to embed 
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the empirical research on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international rela-
tions. In general terms, Hazel Smith (2000: 1) states that ‘international democratic theory, in terms 
of explaining and understanding the interrelationship of democracy, democratization and the inter-
national system, does not exist’. More specifically, Burnell and Calvert (2005: 436) conclude that 
‘closely informed analysis of what might be called the ‘high politics’ of international democracy 
promotion seems to have lagged behind’, referring, inter alia, to ‘the place of democracy promo-
tion in the foreign-policy process of Western governments’ (see also Youngs, 2006: 8–9).
To be sure, there are explicit attempts to theorize democracy promotion. These, however, largely 
focus on dimensions other than the actors that drive, decide on, and implement democracy-promo-
tion policies. Studies that have dealt with democracy promotion as one among other international 
dimensions of democratization (see Erdmann and Kneuer, 2009; Pridham, 1991; Whitehead, 1996) 
almost naturally focus on ‘recipient’ countries – that is, on the impact of democracy-promotion 
policies. In theoretical terms, they draw on theories of democratic transition and consolidation in 
order to conceptualize the different causal mechanisms through which external forces influence the 
domestic politics of regime change. Those international relations scholars who have begun to sys-
tematically analyze democracy promotion also share this focus on impact and causal mechanisms. 
Thus, within the discipline of international relations, democracy promotion is mostly analyzed 
within the paradigms of ‘compliance’ and ‘international socialization’ (see Cowles et al., 2001; 
Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).2 Here, again, it is the mecha-
nisms through which different democracy-promotion policies impact on domestic political change 
that receive theoretical interest. In this sense, a recent edited volume that compares US and European 
democracy-promotion strategies (Magen et al., 2009) draws on an ‘analytical framework’ that 
completely focuses on such mechanisms (the ‘logics’, ‘targets’, and ‘pathways’ of influence), not 
on a theoretical account that might predict/explain/help understand variances and commonalities 
in US and European strategies over time and place (Magen and McFaul, 2009: 11–16).
In general, then, it is the impact and, in particular, the mechanisms of external democracy pro-
motion that have received causal analytical and theoretical attention (see Erdmann and Kneuer, 
2009). Work on the protagonists of external democracy-promotion policies largely remains of a 
descriptive nature, and even when making causal claims mostly does so without an explicit theo-
retical framework (see Carothers, 1999; Magen et al., 2009; Schraeder, 2003; Smith, 1994; Youngs, 
2004, 2006).3 Notable exceptions include Peceny’s (1999) Democracy at the Point of Bayonets, a 
book limited to democracy promotion during US military intervention, and Robinson’s (1996) 
Promoting Polyarchy, probably the most comprehensive attempt to theorize international democ-
racy promotion.
The present article sets out to contribute to filling this gap. It takes a first step towards theorizing 
democracy promotion as part of democratic foreign policy by developing a classification of com-
peting approaches to the phenomenon. The aim is to identify the place and the significance of 
external democracy promotion within the foreign policy of democratic states as conceived of by 
different international relations theories. The article, first, identifies the potential motives behind 
democracy promotion: Why should democratic states care for and invest in the regime type of 
other countries? Here, the research on the democratic peace – the one major research program 
specifically concerned with democratic foreign policy – is discussed. In fact, competing explana-
tions of the democratic peace yield a complex set of arguments in favor of and against promoting 
democracy. On this basis, it is, second, possible to modify existing international relations theories 
so that they can grasp external democracy promotion. Such modifications result in competing 
attempts to locate external democracy promotion within the foreign policy of democratic states. In 
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conclusion, the article presents four sketches of theoretical approaches that offer promising starting 
points for developing – and testing – a comprehensive theory of external democracy promotion.
Having said this, we deliberately take a state-centric perspective. International and nongovern-
mental organizations are, for sure, relevant actors in the field of democracy promotion. Yet, nation-
states are crucial and arguably still the most important type of actors (see Magen and McFaul, 
2009: 2–4; Schraeder, 2003: 34–40). In any case, given the differences in ‘actorness’ between 
states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in international politics, the 
attempt to theorize democracy promotion in general – that is, with an inclusive view on state, mul-
tilateral, and non-state actors – seems rather unpromising.
Motives behind democracy promotion: Implications of research 
on the democratic peace
References to ‘the democratic peace’ abound in the political rhetoric as well as in academic work 
on external democracy promotion (Spanger and Wolff, 2005, 2007b). This is not by chance. 
According to the democratic peace proposition, established democracies should have not only a 
normative claim to, but also a genuine strategic interest in, extending democracy around the globe: 
in order to promote their own benefits (security, trade and investment), in the collective interest 
(international peace, mutually benefiting cooperation), and in the well-understood interests of the 
recipient societies (Czempiel, 1996b: 120–1; Schraeder, 2003: 31). On this very general level, 
then, the democratic peace proposition explains why democratic states, in their foreign (and devel-
opment) policies, aim at promoting democracy.
Stated in this way, we should expect that democracies in general and always promote democ-
racy, while research (and common knowledge) tells us that this is not the case (see Schraeder, 
2002; Smith, 1994; Spanger and Wolff, 2007b). Yet, a closer look at the different explanations 
brought forward to explain the democratic peace and their implications for external democracy 
promotion reveals that the picture is far less clearcut. Corresponding to the concept of the ‘antino-
mies’ of the democratic peace (see Müller, 2004; Geis et al., 2006), the proposed causal mecha-
nisms behind the democratic peace offer good reasons in favor of as well as against promoting 
democracy. In this way, democratic peace research can be used to derive potential motives behind 
democracy promotion.
Utilitarian explanations4
Following up on Immanuel Kant’s argument in his Perpetual Peace, utilitarian explanations of the 
democratic peace trace the peace-proneness of democracies back to the individual citizen. The 
rational citizen is generally interested in peace because war endangers his or her life and welfare. 
If the political system allows for the translation of this preference into foreign policy, the respective 
state will refrain from any offensive use of force (Czempiel, 1996a: 80) or, at least, will prove less 
prone to violence and war than other political regimes (Rummel, 1983: 28). Consequently, the 
presence, behavior, and threat of non-democratic states constitute the main causes of war. Hence, 
efforts to globalize the democratic regime type represent an efficient and sustainable strategy to 
enhance international peace and security.5 Given the extensive financial resources spent on arma-
ment and war, ‘investments’ in democracy promotion promise important net benefits. Further 
empirical observations made in the framework of democratic peace research that point to an excep-
tional democratic disposition to broaden international political and economic cooperation 
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(Mansfield et al., 2002; Russett and Oneal, 2001) further reinforce the direct benefit promised by 
a democratization of one’s own environment (Ikenberry, 1999).
A closer look at the cost–benefit analyses that one could expect from democratic governments 
reveals, however, that there are also important reasons to refrain from engaging in democracy pro-
motion (see Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006: 631–2). The fundamental problem is that pro-
moting democracy implies promoting democratization – that is, a complex and conflict-ridden 
process of political change. This results first in a time-consistency problem: democratization – and, 
thus, democracy promotion – is a middle- to long-term endeavor, and (potential) rewards do not 
come quickly, while costs are immediate. In a rationalist framework, however, a democratic gov-
ernment does only aim at being re-elected (Ray, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999), and in his 
or her electoral decision the utilitarian citizen weighs tangible costs and benefits. To invest in the 
long-term project of democracy promotion becomes even less rational when, second, rewards are 
not only delayed but highly insecure. Yet, research on democratization tells us that democratization 
processes can have diverse outcomes, and a stable liberal democracy is only one, and perhaps a 
rather unlikely, result (Carothers, 2002; Schmitter, 1995). Third, potential rewards from successful 
democratization have to be weighed against the potential costs that evolve from the risks inherent 
in democratization. Even if democracy should in fact have all the benefits mentioned above and 
reliably contribute to peace and security, cooperation and welfare, this instrumental value of 
democracy is heavily disputed for countries undergoing a process of regime change or remaining 
‘stuck’ in a gray zone between autocratic and democratic rule (see Goldsmith, 2008; Spanger and 
Wolff, 2007a). As regards intra- and interstate peace, research has even pointed to a possible con-
flict-enhancing effect of democratization (see Snyder, 2000; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005).
Fourth, a utilitarian approach to democracy promotion requires the external actor to have the 
capacity to achieve, with appropriate efforts, tangible results – tangible results that can be ‘sold’ to 
the domestic audience in the respective democracy-promoting country. Yet, given democratiza-
tion’s character as a largely internally driven process of political change, ‘the net impact of external 
[democracy promotion and protection] upon democratization is likely to be only marginal in deter-
mining the outcome – and, hence, singularly difficult to measure and predict’ (Schmitter and 
Brouwer, 1999: 11; see also Goldsmith, 2008: 136–44). The necessity to achieve tangible results 
refers, fifth, to the importance of relative power (Monten, 2005: 118). Having significant influence 
on political change from the outside with appropriate efforts depends on drastic asymmetries in 
relative power capabilities between ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ countries. Sixth, every national decision 
to engage (or not) in democracy promotion encounters the well-known free-rider problem: The 
successful democratization of a given country is a global public good any country can benefit from 
(by cooperating politically and economically, by not being threatened anymore). Democracy pro-
motion then requires either selective incentives (side payments) or close international coordination 
(burden-sharing) that largely inhibits free riding.
In the end, the instrumental value of democracy suggested by democratic peace research implies 
that a democratic state prefers for any given international ‘partner’, other things being equal, a 
democratic instead of a non- or semi-democratic regime. This, however, does not mean that utili-
tarian cost–benefit analyses by individual citizens or democratic governments lead to an unam-
biguous and invariant preference for external democracy promotion. On the contrary, democracy 
promotion is rational only under very specific conditions: good and relatively short-term prospects 
of success, low risks, high asymmetries in relative power, and selective incentives or close interna-
tional coordination. If these conditions are met, democracy promoters will chose any appropriate 
tool – from foreign aid to military intervention – that promises a net profit.6
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Normative explanations
The ‘cultural’ or normative approach to the democratic peace maintains that democratically social-
ized citizens and leaders are accustomed to solving their conflicts in peaceful and consensus-ori-
ented ways (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001: 53–6). In democratic societies, a 
‘democratic norm of bounded competition’ (Dixon and Senese, 2002: 548) prevails that empha-
sizes mediation, negotiation and compromise. Democratic states externalize these ‘liberal norms of 
non-violent and compromise-oriented resolution of conflict’ (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 501). To be 
successful, the externalization of liberal-democratic norms depends on counterparts that are equally 
prone to cooperative behavior and peaceful conflict resolution. Hence, the more democratic the 
(potential) interaction partners, the better democracies can live out their democratic ‘nature’ by 
constructing international relations that are built on cooperation and mutual trust, overcome the 
security dilemma, and enable the maximization of economic welfare through far-reaching interde-
pendence (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 503–6; see also Doyle, 1983: 230).
The normative explanation, on the one hand, simply reinforces the utilitarian argument in favor 
of democracy promotion: Obviously, established democracies should be interested in enlarging the 
community of democratic states. On the other hand, democracy promotion is about spreading uni-
versally conceived values. Democracy promotion is then embedded in the democratic culture as 
the morally right thing to do, a liberal mission (Sørensen, 2006: 259; see also Smith, 1994). In 
addition, this implies that democratic governments and societies have a ‘natural’ normative affinity 
to democratic (opposition) forces and movements in other countries – a moral impetus that sug-
gests supporting them against oppressive governments.
Again, such an inference of a clearcut orientation in favor of promoting democracy can be con-
trasted by two arguments that equally draw on liberal-democratic norms but render the external 
interference in processes of political change intrinsically problematic. The fundamental problem 
here is that the promotion of democracy, even if it avoids any use of force, is by definition an open 
intervention in the political regime of another state.7 This clashes, first, with the norm of self-
determination, a basic principle in democratic thinking. The respect for self-determination and 
every society’s right to an autonomous process of political evolution suggests a policy of restraint 
and non-intervention (see Doyle, 2009: 352–4; Rawls, 1999: 62; Sørensen, 2006: 258–9). Any 
active engagement in the internal political affairs of other states – which can never be neutral – 
violates, then, a fundamental liberal-democratic norm. Accordingly, in the US tradition of ‘exem-
plarism’, the aim was to spread the (US) model of democracy around the world, not by using an 
activist foreign policy, but through the force of its example (Monten, 2005: 113).
Second, a comprehensive strategy of promoting democracy does not fit neatly into the general 
international attitude attributed to democracy by normative approaches to the democratic peace. In 
a world that is not only made up of democracies, a democratic foreign policy that aims at establish-
ing mutual trust and maintaining international peace has to build international relations of coopera-
tion and partnership also with all those states whose representatives are not or not sufficiently 
(from one’s own perspective) democratically legitimized (Czempiel, 1996a: 97–8). A strategy that 
aims at disempowering the counterpart, supports oppositional groups against the ‘partner’ govern-
ment, and/or makes cooperation conditional on self-defined political standards systematically pro-
duces conflict and mutual distrust. Democracy promotion, then, reinforces processes of international 
exclusion and in-group/out-group dynamics that, instead of contributing to peace and collective 
welfare, increase the risk of war (see Hermann and Kegley, 1995; Kahl, 1999).8
In the end, although democratic norms – or the culture or identity of liberal-democratic states 
– may suggest the aim of global democratization, an activist policy of promoting democracy seems 
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appropriate in two cases only. When, first, a ‘partner’ government (which is already more or less 
democratically elected) shares the aim of ‘deepening’ or ‘consolidating’ democracy, the normative 
contradictions mentioned simply dissolve. When, second, the dominant interpretation of liberal 
norms prevailing in a specific democratic country follows an activist reading of liberalism, the 
normative dilemmas are dealt with in a way that clearly favors democracy promotion. If, on the 
contrary, a democracy’s foreign policy is shaped by strong norms of restraint, non-intervention, 
and/or exemplarism, the country will refrain from actively promoting democracy.9 As regards the 
tools used for promoting democracy, the more the spreading of democracy is seen as a legitimate 
liberal mission, the more interventionist and coercive instruments seem appropriate – and vice 
versa (see Schraeder, 2003, 26–7).
Including democracy promotion in international relations 
theories: Competing approaches
As seen, the attempt to draw implications from democratic peace research for the foreign policy of 
democratic states yields a complex set of arguments in favor of and against promoting democracy. 
On the basis of these potential motives for democracy promotion, it is now possible to modify 
existing theories of international relations so that they can grasp external democracy promotion. 
Utilitarian democratic peace arguments can be included in rationalist perspectives on international 
relations – yielding a conception of democracy promotion as an instrument in support of either 
security/power interests (modified realism) or economic benefits (commercial liberalism). 
Normative explanations of the democratic peace, on the other hand, fit well within reflective per-
spectives that emphasize the importance of either the domestic cultural setting (actor-centered 
constructivism) or the international normative order (sociological institutionalism).10
These four, either rationalist or reflective, approaches leave out, in particular, two important 
international relations theories:11 a basic liberal perspective that emphasizes the variable distribu-
tion of domestic preferences in a given society without assuming that it is always certain domestic 
interests that prevail (republican liberalism), and a neo-Marxist or globalist approach that is most 
prominently represented by neo-Gramscian international political economy. These two theories are 
treated as hybrid approaches, as they are either indeterminate as to the distinction between rational-
ist and reflective approaches (republican liberalism) or combine both perspectives (neo-Gramscian 
international political economy).
Rationalist approaches: Democracy promotion as an instrument
When attempting to construct a (neo)realist approach to democracy promotion, it is most promis-
ing to draw on the variant of realism that Gideon Rose (1998) has termed ‘neoclassical’ (see also 
Wohlforth, 2008: 35–6). Neoclassical realism maintains that systemic pressures and, specifically, 
‘relative material power capabilities’ are the main factors that shape foreign policy, but admits that 
this impact ‘is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through inter-
vening variables at the unit level’ (Rose, 1998: 146). This paves the way for an ‘emphasis on per-
ceptions and ideas’ (Harnisch, 2003: 323): As it is ‘actual political leaders and elites’ that make 
foreign policy choices, it is ‘their perceptions’ that matter (Rose, 1998: 147). Such a realist approach 
is potentially open to accept the democratic peace proposition: ‘Inasmuch as the spread of liberal 
democracy creates shared values, common interests, and, most important, greater transparency of 
state motivations, it should lower threat perceptions and increase cooperation among states’ 
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(Schweller, 2000: 43). If decisionmakers buy into this argument and, thus, accept the empirical 
finding of the democratic peace, democracy promotion becomes an important tool even from the 
perspective of narrow security-oriented national interests.12 From such a ‘security-based approach’ 
(Peceny, 1999: 3), promoting democracy can be seen as a major national interest (see also Youngs, 
2004: 7–14; Smith, 1994). Yet, the fact that the positive impact on national security is long-term 
only implies that in particular situations where the goal of democracy promotion clashes with 
directly tangible security interests, the latter prevail (Carothers, 1999: 16; Smith, 1994). If democ-
racy promotion is conceived of as an instrument, such ‘opportunistic’ behavior is perfectly in line 
with a modified realist perspective on democracy promotion (Schweller, 2000). Democracy is 
promoted as long as it is seen, by decisionmakers, as improving a country’s geostrategic situation 
in the long term, without having immediate negative effects on national security and the relative 
power position. Such cost–benefit calculations depend on the particular democracy-promoting 
‘donor’ country, as well as on the individual ‘recipient’ country, and vary over time.
Commercial liberalism parallels this realist argument but replaces security with economic inter-
ests (see Moravcsik, 1997: 528–30; Doyle, 2008: 60–1).13 Such economically conceived state 
interests can be understood either in terms of maximizing ‘aggregate welfare gains’ or as resulting 
from domestic distributional conflict – that is, in terms of the ‘economic benefits for powerful 
private actors’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 528–9). In this general sense, traditional (materialist) Marxist 
approaches and mainstream (rationalist) international political economy can be subsumed under 
such a commercial liberalism.14 In any case, it is economic cost–benefit calculations that determine 
foreign policy. Given the benefits in terms of economic cooperation and interdependence that 
democratic peace research suggests (see ‘Utilitarian Explanations’, above), promoting democracy 
may well be conceived of as an important part of a general strategy to maximize (national and/or 
particular) commercial benefits (Ikenberry, 1999). Again, however, democracy promotion is only 
one possible instrument in the toolbox of democratic foreign policies. Its relevance for concrete 
foreign policy decisions, thus, depends on case-specific cost–benefit calculations.
Reflective approaches: Democracy promotion as a norm
In a very general sense, reflective approaches to international relations abandon rationalist assump-
tions in that they assume that ‘actors and structures in international politics cannot be properly 
understood independent from social context and that, consequently, aims and corresponding pref-
erences are socially constructed’ (Harnisch, 2003: 329). Given the variety of constructivist, post-
positivist, and post-structuralist approaches to international relations, there are multiple reflective 
perspectives on foreign policy as well (see Checkel, 2008; Harnisch, 2003: 329–40). Yet, given our 
interest in democracy promotion, we deliberately focus on democratic norms and their impact on, 
or relevance for, democratic foreign policy. Although empirically both dimensions operate simul-
taneously and mutually shape each other, for the sake of conceptual clarity it makes sense to ana-
lytically distinguish between the roles of national and international norms (Boekle et al., 1999: 
9–13). The former has its place in actor-centered constructivism, the latter in sociological 
institutionalism.15
An important argument in normative explanations of the democratic peace is that democracies 
tend to externalize their norms of domestic behavior (see ‘Normative Explanations’, above). 
Democratic foreign policies are, thus, seen as shaped by the intrastate normative setting. This per-
fectly fits an actor-centered constructivism that emphasizes national self-images, roles and identi-
ties, and foreign policy cultures (Harnisch, 2003: 340). Here, the embeddedness in a particular 
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sociocultural context is crucial for the emergence, articulation, and change of national preferences; 
for the perception and interpretation of the world outside; and for the translation of such prefer-
ences and perceptions into foreign policy decisions. Such context has been conceptualized in terms 
of ‘national role conceptions’ (Holsti, 1970), national identities (Jepperson et al., 1996), or, more 
general, political culture (Duffield, 1999). Foreign policy cultures, for example, encompass the 
universe of ideas that guide a society’s cognition and agency as related to foreign behavior: ‘They 
are reflected in enduring practices or policy styles which are consolidated in the country’s foreign-
policy institutions’ (Harnisch, 2003: 331–2). The foreign policy culture or role conception of a 
given state combines the self-image of the respective society (identity) and the external expecta-
tions of other actors (see Holsti, 1970: 243, 246; Kirste and Maull, 1996: 289).
Within the framework of actor-centered constructivism, external democracy promotion can be 
seen as a moral mission embedded in the foreign policy culture of a (particular) democratic state that 
is based on a universalist understanding of liberal-democratic norms (Spanger and Wolff, 2007b). In 
this sense, Peceny points to the well-known argument ‘that America’s liberalism fundamentally 
shapes its efforts to promote democracy abroad’: ‘In this approach, U.S. policymakers adopt pro-
liberalization policies because they are compelled to do so by a universally shared cultural bias in 
favor of democracy’ (Peceny, 1999: 3). Examples include the notion of ‘America’s Mission’ (Smith, 
1994) or the reference to the US tradition of ‘vindicationism’ (Monten, 2005).16 Notwithstanding 
such empirical specifications, political culture here determines whether (and to what extent) a coun-
try promotes democracy. In addition, it defines the specific model of democracy that is to be promul-
gated, as well as the appropriate aims and means of democracy promotion. As a consequence, 
variance in democracy-promotion policies is to be expected between countries, as these are charac-
terized by different cultures, identities, or roles – but across time and different ‘recipient countries’ 
a given ‘donor’ country should exhibit significant common features according to the place and form 
of democracy promotion within the respective political culture. As a shorthand, democracy promo-
tion here can be conceived of as a domestic norm – or, more precisely, a collection of norms 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). In any case, as the democratic-norm complex is seen as embed-
ded in a national society’s culture, it not only has causal effect on democracy-promotion policies in 
the sense of regulative norms – that is, norms that ‘order and constrain behavior’; it also operates as 
a constitutive norm because it is part and parcel of the self-conception (and thus the constitution) of 
the collective actor itself (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891; see Wendt, 1999: 165).
While actor-centered constructivism focuses on the domestic sociocultural context of foreign 
policy, an analogous argument can be made with a view to the impact of ‘international cultural 
environments’ on foreign policy (Jepperson et al., 1996: 34). Following Katzenstein (1996), this 
approach can be called sociological institutionalism. Following the English School’s notion of an 
international ‘society’, ‘in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system adhere to 
shared norms and rules’, the international environment is seen as composed not only of formal 
institutions and regimes: there is also a ‘world political culture’ that ‘includes elements like rules of 
sovereignty and international law, norms for the proper enactment of sovereign statehood, standard-
ized social and political technologies ... and a transnational political discourse’ (Jepperson et al., 
1996: 45, 34). International norms, in this sense, define collectively shared expectations of appro-
priate behavior – following the constructivist notion of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and 
Olsen, 1998). In the case of drastic violations of primary international norms, the risk of ‘being 
classified as acting outside the bounds of ‘civilized’ international society’ (Price and Tannenwald, 
1996: 145) can constitute a barrier against ‘inappropriate’ behavior that operates quite reliably. 
However, in general, the connection between such international norms and foreign policy ‘is one in 
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which norms create permissive [and constraining] conditions for action but do not determine action’ 
(Finnemore, 1996: 158; see also Price and Tannenwald, 1996: 145; Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463).
The consequence for democracy promotion is evident. Jepperson et al. (1996: 47–8) themselves 
highlighted the ‘spread of democratic ideologies and market models’ as ‘obvious examples, along 
with the underlying consolidation of regional and even global ideologies of citizenship and human 
rights’. Assuming, in line with McFaul (2005), that not only democracy and (political) human 
rights but also their external promotion has become an international norm, this would imply inter- 
and transnational expectations regarding which states would have to legitimate their external 
behavior as appropriate – that is, as contributing to, or at least not contradicting, the aim of promot-
ing and protecting democracy around the world (or in a given region). Democracy promotion, then, 
can be conceived of as a regulative norm established on the international level. From this perspec-
tive, variance in democracy-promotion policies follows, first, from the fact that international norms 
do not determine, but only enable and constrain, foreign policy. In addition, even if democracy and 
democracy promotion are generally established as regional or global norms, the precise meaning 
of democracy is always contested and the question what, in a given situation, might promote, pro-
tect, hinder, or undermine democracy is at times difficult to answer. Thus, ample margins remain 
for the usual ‘national interests’ and particular national values and norms to shape foreign policy 
decisions. Second, the level of institutionalization of democratic international norms varies across 
regions and international organizations, leaving different states (and different pairs of states) with 
different (common) international environments (see Hawkins, 2008: 392–4). However, within one 
and the same international environment, we should expect basic similarities in democracy-promo-
tion policies across different ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ countries.
Hybrid approaches to democracy promotion
The variant of liberal theory Moravcsik terms ‘republican’ liberalism relates most directly to dem-
ocratic peace research. Key variables of republican liberalism include, on the one hand, the distri-
bution of ‘social preferences’ and, on the other, ‘the mode of domestic political representation’ that 
determines which preferences ‘are institutionally privileged’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 530). The foreign 
policy of democratic states, then, is shaped by three factors: the distribution of social preferences 
in a given society; the capacity of social groups to articulate these preferences; and the specific 
shape of political institutions that influence different groups’ success in securing political represen-
tation. This said, the substance of democratic foreign policies remains fundamentally indetermi-
nate, because the ‘precise policy of governments depends on which domestic groups are represented’ 
(Moravcsik, 1997: 530). The relevance of democracy promotion for a given state, then, depends on 
the question to what extent strong NGOs, interest groups and/or public opinion call (or not) for a 
democratic orientation of foreign and development policies. Obviously, it is impossible to draw 
general conclusions for democracy promotion. If public opinion and/or influential social groups 
see the expansion of democracy – in general or in a specific country – as an important (normative) 
goal the respective state should pursue, then democracy promotion ends up being an important 
goal. If people are led by the conviction that promoting democracy enhances peace and/or welfare, 
democracy will be promoted as an instrument. And, if people do not care about the political situa-
tion in other countries, or think that democracy is a political regime that can only grow from within, 
there will be no effort at promoting democracy at all. This said, as long as we do not define indi-
viduals and social groups as behaving according either to an entirely rationalist or to a reflectivist 
logic, republican liberalism is indeterminate also with regard to this basic distinction.
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Neo-Gramscian international political economy (Cox, 1996), if modified along the lines pro-
posed by William Robinson (1996), offers a second hybrid approach to democracy promotion (see 
Cavell, 2002; Geis and Wolff, 2007). According to Robinson (1996: 4), US democracy promotion 
‘can only be understood as part of a broader process of the exercise of hegemony within and 
between countries in the context of transnationalization’. Promoting what Robinson calls ‘polyar-
chy’ or ‘low-intensity democracy’ aims ‘not only at mitigating the social and political tensions 
produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass 
aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of social life in the twenty-first-century inter-
national order’ (Robinson, 1996: 6). The underlying observation guiding policymakers (and the 
transnational elite driving them) reads: Under conditions of a globalizing economy, a ‘rearrange-
ment of political systems in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the “world system”’ is 
required that includes limited democratic reforms ‘so as to secure the underlying objective of 
maintaining essentially undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system’ 
(Robinson, 1996: 6). Following the Gramscian concept of hegemony as ‘consensual domination’, 
the promotion of ‘low-intensity democracy’, in terms of ideology, makes use of the ‘universal 
aspiration’ to and the ‘mass appeal’ of democracy (Robinson, 1996: 16). In terms of political inclu-
sion, it makes use of democracy’s ‘mechanisms for intra-elite compromise and accommodation 
and for hegemonic incorporation of popular majorities’ (Robinson, 2000: 312).
That said, democracy-promotion policies follow ‘the view that “democracy” is the most effec-
tive means of assuring stability, the former seen as but a mechanism for the latter’ (Robinson, 1996: 
66). Yet, such a simple instrumentalist perspective (in line with the rationalist approaches discussed 
above) does not capture the neo-Gramscian modification of materialist international political econ-
omy. In order for it to be effective as an instrument of hegemonic (i.e. consensual) domination, the 
people in the ‘recipient’ countries have to believe in polyarchy-as-democracy, while at the interna-
tional level democracy promotion needs at least a certain amount of credibility in order to work. 
Neither requirement is compatible, theoretically, with a purely rationalist perspective or, empiri-
cally, with a merely opportunistic treatment of democracy promotion as an instrument that can be 
dropped any time it contradicts ‘real’ interests (see Geis and Wolff, 2007; Guilhot, 2005). 
Democracy-promotion policies need to appear to be serious, at least to some extent – otherwise the 
ideological capacity to filter out ‘as illegitimate demands that actually call into question the social 
order itself’ (Robinson, 1996: 30) will be lost. This reflective dimension of neo-Gramscian thought 
implies that democracy and democracy promotion have to have some relevance as regulative norms.
Locating external democracy promotion in democratic foreign policies
The result of this attempt to modify theories of international relations so that they can grasp democ-
racy promotion is summarized in Table I. In general, we identify seven different ways in which the 
external promotion of democracy can be located within the framework of democratic foreign poli-
cies. Yet, as will be argued below, only four approaches offer promising starting points for develop-
ing a comprehensive theory of democracy promotion.
From a purely materialist perspective, democracy promotion, as it appears in contemporary 
foreign and development policy discourse, has merely a rhetorical character without any impor-
tance for ‘real’ foreign policy (Type 1): Although we might wonder why political actors speak 
about something they all know has no significance at all, talk is seen as cheap here, and no theoreti-
cal approach to democracy promotion is needed if we are to understand foreign policy and interna-
tional relations. Therefore, such a purely materialist perspective (as, for example, in structural 
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Table I. Locating external democracy promotion (EDP) in democratic foreign policies
No. Type Role/Relevance of EDP Theoretical Approach
1 Rhetoric EDP is employed rhetorically only, 
without implications for foreign  
policy.
(No theoretical approach needed)
2 Instrument EDP is one instrument among  
others that is applied to the  
extent that it contributes to the  
‘real’ aims that guide foreign policy.
Materialist theory of democracy 
promotion (theoretical background: 
modified neoclassical realism; 
economic liberalism; utilitarian 
democratic peace approaches)
3 Secondary aim EDP constitutes an aim that guides 
foreign policy, but loses significance 
when competing with other  
(primary) aims.
(Combination of theoretical approaches)
4 Primary aim EDP constitutes an aim that guides 
foreign policy, on a par with other 
foreign policy preferences.
(Combination of theoretical approaches)
5 Regulative norm EDP defines the range of  
appropriate behavior – that is, 
foreign policy has to be framed 
as contributing to (at least, not 
contradicting) EDP.
Normative theory of democracy 
promotion (theoretical background: 
sociological institutionalism; 
normative democratic peace 
approaches)
6 Constitutive norm EDP constitutes part and parcel of 
the foreign policy identity, culture, 
or role model that shapes the very 
definition of preferences  
and strategies.
Cultural theory of democracy 
promotion (theoretical background: 
actor-centered constructivism; 
normative democratic peace 
approaches)
7 Hegemonic project EDP constitutes part and parcel of a 
global hegemonic project that uses 
EDP instrumentally, but rests upon  
its normative credibility.
Critical theory of democracy 
promotion (theoretical background: 
neo-Gramscian international  
political economy)
versions of realism or Marxism) was not discussed in this article and needs no further refinement 
as far as the analysis of democracy promotion is concerned. It represents the null hypothesis 
according to which the whole endeavor proposed in this article is a futile exercise.
A neoclassical realism that takes the democratic peace proposition into account conceptualizes 
democracy promotion as an instrument (Type 2) – just like an equally modified commercial liberal-
ism and, correspondingly, utilitarian approaches to the democratic peace. Here, democracy promo-
tion is conceived of as one instrument among others that is applied to the extent that it contributes 
to the ‘real’ aims (the famous ‘national interests’) that guide foreign policy (see Burnell, 2000b: 
46). In other words, democracy is promoted or not according to opportunistic cost–benefit calcula-
tions, as outlined earlier in the section entitled ‘Utilitarian Explanations’. This would be the start-
ing point for a materialist theory of democracy promotion.
Type 3 treats democracy promotion as a secondary aim that guides foreign policy, but that loses 
significance when competing with other (primary) aims. This corresponds to what Carothers 
(1999: 16) has called the ‘semi-realist approach to democracy promotion’, as well as to Schraeder’s 
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distinction between the ‘normative goal of democracy’ and the ‘central foreign policy interests’ 
that ultimately dominate normative considerations (Schraeder, 2003: 41, 33; see endnote 3). One 
step further, democracy promotion may be even seen as a primary aim, on a par with other foreign 
political interests (Type 4). This is perhaps what McFaul (2005: 158) has in mind when he sub-
sumes ‘democracy promotion’ under ‘strategic objectives’. Both conceptions of democracy pro-
motion as primary or secondary aims are, however, difficult to conceptualize in theoretical terms. 
Promoting democracy might become strategic (in McFaul’s sense) or an important yet secondary 
goal (as with Carothers and Schraeder) when it is seen by foreign policymakers as an instrument 
that more or less heavily and regularly contributes to important (strategic) aims – but then we end 
up with Type 2. Alternatively, democracy may in fact be promoted with a view to its intrinsic value 
when either the domestic audience policymakers respond to or policymakers themselves believe 
in democracy – in both cases, however, democracy promotion operates as a regulative norm 
(Type 5).17 When Carothers or Schraeder call democracy promotion an important yet secondary 
goal, they usually subsume both Type 2 and Type 5 under one heading: Democratic governments 
promote democracy both because they believe in its instrumental value and, at the same time, 
because they hold it normatively appropriate to do (or at least say) so. This is a plausible interpreta-
tion of the empirical evidence, but for the sake of conceptual clarity it is probably better to first 
analytically differentiate both roles of democracy promotion.18 Hence, Types 3 and 4 can either be 
subsumed under Types 2 or 5, or they represent different combinations of the instrumental and 
normative perspectives. In both cases, they are not self-contained theoretical approaches.
Democracy promotion as a regulative norm (Type 5) directly follows from normative explana-
tions of the democratic peace and sociological institutionalism. Here, democracy and democracy 
promotion as national (democratic peace) or international (sociological institutionalism) norms 
regulate foreign policy in the sense that they constitute parts of the normative setting that defines 
appropriate behavior (and its limits): Foreign policymakers either intrinsically promote democracy 
as the appropriate thing to do or have to take and frame their decisions as contributing to (or, at 
least, not contradicting) the aim of democracy promotion. In both cases, it is norms that shape 
democracy-promotion policies – the sketch of a normative theory of democracy promotion.
Type 6, democracy promotion as a constitutive norm, represents a special case of actor-centered 
constructivism19 where international democracy promotion becomes part and parcel of the collec-
tive identity, the political culture, or the role model of a particular democratic state. In general, 
democracy promotion here also operates as a regulative norm (as policies are taken, or at least 
framed, as appropriate according to the aim of promoting democracy), but its importance goes 
further in shaping the very definition of preferences and strategies. In any case, according to such 
a cultural theory of democracy promotion, democratic foreign policies have to be analyzed as 
resulting from country-specific cultural dispositions.
The neo-Gramscian approach, as seen, starts with an instrumental approach (Type 2), but in the end 
democracy and democracy promotion, here, have to be seen as a regulative norm as well (Type 5). The 
adaptation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony to international relations provides such a critical 
theory of democracy promotion with a distinct hybrid and yet theoretically coherent shape.
Conclusion
How can democracy promotion be theorized as part of democratic foreign policy? The present 
article has, first, identified potential motives behind democracy promotion by drawing on the 
research program of the democratic peace. Through the incorporation of insights from the 
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democratic peace into major international relations theories, the latter could, then, be modified in 
order to develop competing approaches to democracy promotion. The result is four such approaches 
that can serve as starting points for developing – and testing – a comprehensive theory of external 
democracy promotion.
A materialist theory of democracy promotion can draw on rationalist approaches, modified by 
results reported by democratic peace research. Promoting democracy is seen as one instrument 
among others; it will be applied if and only if it is assumed to serve ‘real’ – that is, material – 
national interests. A normative theory of democracy promotion rests upon normative explanations 
of the democratic peace and sociological institutionalism and conceives of democracy promotion 
as a national or international norm that regulates foreign policy. Democratic states promote democ-
racy to the extent that they follow a corresponding logic of appropriateness established by the 
respective norm. A cultural theory of democracy promotion corresponds to the perspective of 
actor-centered constructivism. Democracy is promoted to the extent that active democracy promo-
tion as a constitutive norm is a part of the collective identity or political culture of the respective 
country. A critical theory of democracy promotion, based on neo-Gramscian reasoning, treats the 
promotion of democracy as part of a hegemonic project wherein democracy promotion is an impor-
tant instrument – but an instrument that requires democracy’s (and democracy promotion’s) nor-
mative significance in order to be effective.
A major debate in democracy-promotion research concerns different strategies and instruments 
(see Magen and McFaul, 2009: 11–16; Schraeder, 2003: 26–7). The four approaches, here, yield 
different expectations as to the choice of tools. According to the materialist perspective, it is cost–
benefit calculations that determine whether diplomatic means, foreign aid, economic sanctions, 
military intervention, or a combination of different instruments is chosen (see Bueno de Mesquita 
and Downs, 2006). In the framework of the normative theory, it is the extent to which democracy 
is established as a universal norm or right that determines which degree of coerciveness in democ-
racy promotion and, hence, which tools are deemed appropriate (see Fox and Roth, 2000). The 
cultural theory, for its part, traces the choice of tools back to the political culture of a given coun-
try: The more democracy promotion is seen as part of a liberal mission, the more coercive instru-
ments will be applied; the more democracy is seen as something that has to grow from within 
society, the more low-key tools (if any) are preferred (see Spanger and Wolff, 2007b: 275–80). 
From the critical perspective, cost–benefit calculations – as in the materialist version – are modi-
fied by the need to uphold the ideational hegemony of low-intensity democracy as consensual 
domination. Hence we should expect a preference for non-coercive tools aiming at cooperation 
with local elites and cooptation of subaltern groups; coercive means are generally not chosen to 
promote democracy – military interventions that may be justified in terms of democracy promotion 
will always be driven by the dominant interest to uphold the capitalist social/world order (see 
Robinson, 2000).
Obviously, each one of these theoretical sketches requires much more refinement in terms of 
theoretical foundation, conceptual clarity, and empirical propositions. This should include incorpo-
rating systematic propositions regarding the interaction with (different types of) ‘recipient’ coun-
tries.20 Furthermore, although the four approaches cut across the range of existing international 
relations theories, we would not dare to assume that there could not be plausible alternative per-
spectives to be constructed.21 In any case, a theoretical classification – like the one proposed in this 
article – is a starting point only. Theories of external democracy promotion are only useful to the 
extent that they help us understand and/or explain the actual practices in the respective political 
field. In general terms, the systematization proposed might pave the way for theoretically guided 
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comparative case studies on the politics of international democracy promotion. This obviously can 
include theory-testing via quantitative large-N, qualitative small-n, or middle-range (e.g. Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis) studies. However, the rather low level of theory development suggests that 
heuristic case studies – to ‘inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and 
causal paths’ – or plausibility probes – as ‘preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and 
hypotheses’ – could be more appropriate (George and Bennett, 2005: 75). Certainly, while the pres-
ent article contributes to filling the theoretical gap outlined at the outset, it offers no more than a 
first step.
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Notes
 1.  Besides early (and continuously growing) work on US democracy promotion (see Carothers, 1999; Cavell, 
2002; Cox et al., 2000; Peceny, 1999; Robinson, 1996; Smith, 1994) and the role of external factors and 
actors in the democratization processes in Southern Europe and Latin America (see Lowenthal, 1991; 
Pridham, 1991; Farer, 1996; Whitehead, 1996), there are now case studies on a whole range of ‘donors’ and 
‘recipient countries’ (see Hawkins, 2008; Legler et al., 2007; Newman and Rich, 2004; Schimmelfennig et 
al., 2006; Youngs, 2004), quantitative large-N studies especially on the impact of democracy-promotion 
policies (see Finkel et al., 2007; Knack, 2004; Scott and Steele, 2005), edited volumes with a comparative 
focus on different ‘donor’ and ‘recipient countries’ (see Burnell, 2000a; Erdmann and Kneuer, 2009; 
Hanisch, 1996; Jünemann and Knodt, 2007; Magen et al., 2009; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000; Schraeder, 
2002; Teixeira, 2008; Youngs, 2006), analyses of the ideas, ideologies, and ideologues behind democracy 
promotion (see Guilhot, 2005; Smith, 2007), and innumerable policy-oriented papers.
 2. This continues earlier work on the socialization of human rights norms (Risse et al., 1999).
 3.  In this sense, Carothers’ ‘semi-realist approach to democracy promotion’ does not refer to a theoretical 
approach, but describes the empirically observed approach to democracy promotion that characterizes US 
foreign policy. The latter is called ‘semi-realist’ because democracy promotion ‘remains at most one of 
several main U.S. interests, sometimes compatible with and sometimes contrary to economic or security 
interests. When contrary, it is usually overridden’ (Carothers, 1999: 16). In synthesizing the results of a 
comparative research project, Schraeder concludes that different democracy-promoting countries are 
guided by different ‘central foreign policy interests’; when ‘the normative goal of democracy’ clashes 
with these other foreign policy interests, it is ‘typically compromised’ (Schraeder, 2003: 33, 41). Yet, 
there is no attempt either to theorize this (perhaps secondary) role of democracy promotion or to offer a 
theoretical account that encompasses both the variable ‘foreign policy interests’ and the ‘normative goal’ 
(as well as the articulation between interests and norms). In a similar vein, Magen and McFaul (2009: 
20–4) set out to explain similarities and differences in ‘American’ and ‘European’ democracy-promotion 
policies by referring, largely ad hoc, to three main factors: the ‘historical contexts and main formative 
experiences’, ‘the fundamentally different types of polities’, and the ‘type and degree of power’.
 4.  In this article, we are not interested in the different explanatory approaches of the democratic peace as 
such. Thus, we will differentiate neither between the different explanations that ultimately argue within a 
rationalist framework nor between those within the ‘normative camp’. The former include not only the 
explanation that focuses on the ‘traditional’ utilitarian argument drawn from Kant, but also institutionalist 
approaches such as that proposed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999). The latter include, first, monadic 
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explanations that emphasize the peaceful ‘culture’ that characterizes democracy as such and, second, 
dyadic arguments that reject the claim that democracies are generally peaceful but attribute the inter-
democratic peace to specific interaction dynamics in democratic pairs of states (see Risse-Kappen, 1995; 
Müller and Wolff, 2006).
 5.  The same holds for the rational-choice explanation of the separate democratic peace: If it is democratic 
leaders only who ‘prefer to negotiate when they do not anticipate military success’ (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 1999: 799) – because, given their interest in re-election, they cannot risk defeat – it would be in the 
best interest of the world’s democracies to democratize all of the various non-democratic regimes that 
may, at any time, prematurely and irrationally rush into war.
 6.  For example, Schraeder (2003: 26) distinguishes – ‘in order from the least to most coercive’ – the follow-
ing ‘interventionist tools’: classical diplomacy, foreign aid, political conditionalities, economic sanctions, 
covert intervention, paramilitary intervention, and military intervention.
 7.  To be sure, the different tools in democracy promotion differ dramatically in their degree of coerciveness 
(see footnote 6, above). Yet, even pure democracy assistance – that is, foreign aid oriented at promoting 
democracy – constitutes a non-neutral measure that deliberately tries to shape the domestic political 
development of another country.
 8.  The result is what Beate Jahn (2005: 202–4) has called a ‘specifically liberal security dilemma’: On the 
one hand, liberal democracies see their external environment as ‘populated by non-liberal and aggressive 
states’, while, on the other, non-democracies have to fear liberal intervention because they are not 
accepted as legitimate (sovereign) states.
 9.  Recently, a series of scholars have argued that liberal norms are fundamentally ambivalent and can give 
rise either to a rather cautious/passive or to an activist/interventionist foreign policy. Thus, Müller (2004) 
distinguishes between ‘militant’ and ‘pacifist’ democracies, Sørensen (2006) identifies a ‘liberalism of 
restraint’ and a ‘liberalism of imposition’, and Monten (2005) discusses the US traditions of ‘exemplar-
ism’ and ‘vindicationism’.
10. The distinction between rationalist and reflective approaches draws on Keohane (1988).
11.  Of course, the selection of these six approaches is to a certain degree arbitrary – as is every selection of 
‘the’ major theories of international relations. Yet, we claim that they represent a reasonable attempt to 
cover the range of potential perspectives on democracy promotion that can be developed out of what are 
usually considered grand international relations theories.
12.  Whether such a modified ‘neoclassical’ realism should still be called realist is certainly open to question 
(Smith, 2000: 10). Yet, what is important for this article is not the realist label but the attempt to construe 
a security-based approach to democracy promotion – which we, as a matter of convenience, agree to call 
‘realist’.
13.  Moravcsik has proposed three variants of liberalism as cornerstones of one coherent liberal theory. Yet, it 
remains unclear how concrete foreign policy decisions might be explained by reference to such a threefold 
liberalist approach (Harnisch, 2003: 326–7). Therefore, we will assign Moravcsik’s three variants of liberal 
theory to three different approaches to foreign policy, adopting his categories ‘commercial’ and ‘republican’ 
liberalism, and subsuming ‘ideational’ liberalism under what we will dub actor-centered constructivism. 
Ideational liberalism’s emphasis on a ‘configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic 
determinant of state preferences’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 525) obviously departs from a rationalist perspective.
14.  As Moravcsik (1997: 522n23) argues, the main assumptions of Marxism – ‘the centrality of domestic 
economic interests, the importance of transnational interdependence, the state as a representative of domi-
nant social forces – are quite compatible with this restatement of liberalism’. The same holds true for 
mainstream international political economy (see Frieden and Martin, 2002).
15.  The term actor-centered constructivism is taken from Harnisch (2003), the term sociological institutional-
ism borrowed from Katzenstein (1996).
16.  Drawing on the work of H. W. Brands, Monten distinguishes two US traditions in foreign policy: According 
to exemplarism, the USA ‘exerts influence on the world through the force of its example’, while ‘an activ-
ist foreign policy may even corrupt liberal practices at home, undermining the potency of the U.S. model’; 
vindicationism, in contrast, ‘argues that the United States must move beyond example and undertake active 
measures to spread its universal political values and institutions’ (Monten, 2005: 113).
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17.  In the case of democracy promotion as a constitutional norm (Type 6), as we will see, the differentiation 
between ‘normative’ or secondary goals and primary ‘interests’ is difficult to uphold.
18.  Burnell (2000b: 45) explicitly argues that ‘competing broad-gauge theories claiming to explain the rise of 
democracy assistance’ should not be seen as ‘mutually exclusive’. Again, while certainly no single theory 
will ever explain everything, it might be a useful starting point to conceptualize distinct theoretical 
approaches. In addition, a combination of different theories itself has to be properly conceptualized in 
theoretical terms, too.
19.  In general, depending on the respective political culture, actor-centered constructivism is compatible with 
any of the types. The same indeterminacy holds for republican liberalism, as it (at least in the version 
proposed in this article) depends on the (variable) preferences of individual citizens and interest groups.
20.  For example, the materialist theory would suggest that a democratic state refrains from promoting democ-
racy when interacting with a cooperative non-democratic state and skips democracy-promotion policies 
when they significantly harm bilateral cooperation (and thus imply costs), whereas normative and cul-
tural theories predict that the aim of promoting democracy has always at least some relevance.
21.  Although regularly refraining from making causal claims, such an alternative could possibly include a 
post-structuralist/postmodern approach to democracy promotion, for example along the line of David 
Campbell’s (1992) work on US foreign policy. We owe this idea to Milja Kurki.
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